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EXPUNGEMENT AND
POST-EXONERATION OFFENDING
*AMY SHLOSBERG*
**EVAN J. MANDERY**
*** &VALERIE WEST*** &
****BENNETT CALLAGHAN****
This is the second Article stemming from a study of the post-release
behavior of wrongfully convicted individuals. Utilizing data on exonerees
compiled from the Center on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern
University, the study tracks the behavior of 118 exonerees following their
releases and examines the effects of more than twenty variables on their
post-release criminality. We present here our findings on the ameliorative
effects of expungement on post-exoneration offending. Expungement would
seemingly be an obvious remedy for wrongfully convicted individuals, but
in fact, almost one-third of exonerees do not have their records purged. We
found that a failure to expunge was a significant predictor of postexoneration offending.1 This relationship was strongest for offenders who
had not committed an offense prior to the one for which they were
wrongfully convicted. The problematic impact of failing to expunge is
generally consistent with labeling theory, as are the findings regarding the
effects on exonerees without prior records, which are supported by
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Other variables that were related to post-exoneration offending, but are not the focus of
this Article, include prior conviction(s) and age at release.
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research suggesting that labeling effects are strongest for first-time
offenders. The universe of exonerees is small; our data is not drawn from a
sample. Thus, we present our observations about the relationship of postrelease offending and expungement with caution. Nevertheless, the data
suggests that expunging exonerees’ records is defensible, not only as a
matter of fundamental fairness but also on public policy grounds.
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INTRODUCTION
Although the problem of wrongful convictions has recently come into
clearer focus, very little attention has been paid to the factors that allow
exonerees to successfully reenter society, and almost none at all has been
paid to the commonsensical measure of expunging the exonerees’ records
of the offense for which they were wrongfully convicted. Fundamental
fairness would seem to require expungement, and yet in our study of 118
individuals who were exonerated and released between 1999 and 2009, we
found that approximately one-third did not have their records expunged.
Generally speaking, expungement laws are restrictive. The federal
government does not allow records to be expunged, and many states either
do not allow records to be expunged or do so only under very limited
circumstances. “Expungement” also means different things in different
places. In some jurisdictions, expunged records do not disappear.2 In three
of the four states covered by our study—Florida, Illinois, and Texas—
securing expungement is extremely difficult. In the fourth state, New York,

2

See generally 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2414 (2011).
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the situation is substantially better.3 Perhaps not coincidentally, postexoneration offending is dramatically lower in New York than in the other
states in the study. As one might imagine, failing to expunge an exoneree’s
record has problematic consequences. Among exonerees who had their
records expunged, 31.6% committed a post-exoneration offense (PEO)
compared to 50% of those who did not have their records expunged. Of the
four states in the study, New York has by far the most favorable
expungement laws. There, only 8.3% of exonerees offended following their
releases. This association is consistent with seminal concepts of labeling
theory, which holds that status as a former criminal has a stigmatizing effect
and acts as a substantial barrier to reentry. Several studies suggest that
labeling effects are strongest for first-time offenders and, indeed, in our
study the statistical benefits of expungement were driven principally by its
ameliorative outcomes for exonerees without prior records.
On the whole, these findings suggest that exoneree expungement,
which heretofore has been virtually ignored as a public policy issue,
deserves far greater attention. Expungement is a nearly costless way to help
ensure that exonerees make successful transitions into society following
their releases. Following this Introduction, this Article offers a survey of
expungement laws. Part II describes the larger project and details the
methodology employed. Part III presents our results. In Part IV, we
explain how labeling theory can shed light on the problematic consequences
of failing to expunge and consider alternative explanations for the
association we found between expungement and post-release offending.
We conclude with some directions for further study and some simple
suggestions for reforming the law.
I. A SURVEY OF EXPUNGEMENT LAW
A. OVERVIEW

Forty-five states and the District of Columbia currently have some
mechanism through which an individual may expunge or limit disclosure of
a criminal record.4 These laws differ wildly.5 The first difference is one of
nomenclature: the process of limiting disclosure of criminal records to the

3

See infra Part I.B.
See Fruqan Mouzon, Forgive Us Our Trespasses: The Need for Federal Expungement
Legislation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 31 (2008).
5
See generally Kristin K. Henson, Comment, Can You Make This Go Away?: Alabama’s
Inconsistent Approach to Expunging Criminal Records, 35 CUMB. L. REV. 385, 392–412
(2005) (discussing how state approaches to expungement vary).
4
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public may be referred to as “expungement,”6 “expunction,”7 “sealing,”8
“setting aside,”9 “destruction,”10 “purging,”11 or “erasure.”12 States also
differ substantially in their preconditions for expungement of a criminal
record, and in both the manner and procedure by which they carry it out.
While almost no two statutes are the same, some commonalities
regarding expungement do exist. Almost every state, for example, allows
for the expungement of records related to minor offenses committed by
juveniles.13 Most states also allow for the expungement of arrest and court
records relating to cases that did not end in convictions.14 This includes
6
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-901 (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4371–4375
(2012); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 831-3.2 (LexisNexis 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-40-102
(LexisNexis 2012). These differences in nomenclature sometimes connote substantive
differences. Generally speaking, a “sealed” record will not be available to the public, but the
court will maintain a confidential copy; an “expunged” record, in contrast, is destroyed. See
Carlton J. Snow, Expungement and Employment Law: The Conflict Between an Employer’s
Need to Know About Juvenile Misdeeds and an Employee’s Need to Keep Them Secret, 41
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 21–25 (1992); Henson, Comment, supra note 5, at 393–
96. Even this rule has its exceptions, however. For example, in North Carolina “expunged”
records can be searched, retrieved, and used (although this occurs only in exceptional
circumstances and normally requires a court order or statutory authorization). N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 15A-151 (2013).
7
See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-71 (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 15A-145
to -152 (2013).
8
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.62.180 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2953.31–.61
(LexisNexis 2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 19 (2012).
9
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-907 (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV.
§§ 780.621–.624 (LexisNexis 2012).
10
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8 (West 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-32-101
to -104 (2012).
11
See ALA. CODE § 41-9-645 (LexisNexis 2012).
12
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-142A (2012).
13
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-136 (LexisNexis 2012); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 276,
§ 100B (LexisNexis 2012). Even in this context there is variation, as many states exclude
certain crimes or impose other preconditions. In California, for example, five years after the
termination of any punishment or when the person turns eighteen, a juvenile offender can
petition the court to seal the records relating to the offense. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 781 (West 2013). The remedy is unavailable, however, for specified offenses (mostly
serious, violent crimes), if the petitioner has been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor that
indicates “moral turpitude” in the intervening five years, or if the petitioner has not been
rehabilitated to the satisfaction of the court. See id. In North Carolina, expungement of a
juvenile offense is possible if and only if: (1) the offender was younger than eighteen years
old at the time of the offense—or twenty-one years old if the conviction was for minor
consumption of alcohol; (2) he has gone at least two years without a conviction for another
crime, except for minor traffic violations, and (3) he can supply affidavits from two
nonrelatives attesting to his good behavior. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-145 (West
2013). See generally Snow, supra note 6, at 35–40 (providing an overview of juvenile
expungement statutes).
14
See Mouzon, supra note 4, at 32.
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instances where the cases were dismissed or ended in nolle prosequi, the
defendant was acquitted at trial, or the statute of limitations expired before
the prosecutor pressed charges.15 The District of Columbia and some other
states, including Nebraska and Pennsylvania, offer expungement to those
who take part in “diversion programs,” which may include treatment for
problems with drugs or alcohol.16 Under certain limited circumstances in a
handful of states, expungement of arrest records is mandatory or construed
as a right.17
Generally, however, expungement is not guaranteed. In the federal
system, most offenses are not eligible for expungement.18 At the state level,
even where expungement is possible, it is often excluded where a charge is
dismissed through plea-bargaining or in exchange for testimony regarding
another crime.19 Other states preclude certain charges from being
expunged20 or deny expungement to offenders with certain kinds of prior
offense records.21 Some expungement statutes require petitioners to wait a
certain amount of time before they can file for expungement.22 In some
states, a conviction obtained during this waiting period, or a charge pending

15
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:9 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-40-102 to -105
(LexisNexis 2012); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-392.1–.4 (2012).
16
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-3523(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2012); 234 PA. CODE § 320
(2011); D.C. CODE § 24-751.10(d), invalidated by D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics v. D.C.,
866 A.2d 788 (D.C. 2005).
17
For example, in Georgia, “[a]n individual has the right to have his or her record of
such arrest expunged” if the charges against him or her were dismissed, there are no other
criminal charges pending, and he or she has never previously been convicted of the same or
a similar offense. GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-37(d)(3) (2012). For a discussion of Delaware’s
statute, see infra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
18
See United States v. Coloian, 480 F.3d 47, 49 n.4 (1st Cir. 2007). Proposed federal
bills have sought to allow certain offenses to be expunged in limited circumstances. See
Fresh Start Act of 2013, H.R. 3014, 113th Cong. (2013); Fresh Start Act of 2011, H.R. 2449,
112th Cong. (2011); Fresh Start Act of 2010, H.R. 5492, 111th Cong. (2010). Under these
bills, all introduced by Representative Steve Cohen of Tennessee, only nonviolent, first-time
offenders are eligible. See H.R. 3014 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3631 (2012) to make
nonviolent, first-time offenders eligible for expungement).
19
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-308(1)(a)(II)(A)–(B) (2012).
20
For example, in Utah, one is not eligible for expungement in a case of vehicular
homicide or a felony DUI charge. See Expunging Adult Criminal Records, UTAH STATE
COURTS, http://goo.gl/WsFDhf (last updated July 11, 2013).
21
North Carolina and West Virginia, for example, preclude the expungement of arrest
records for people with previous felony convictions. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-146
(2013); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-25(a) (LexisNexis 2012).
22
For example, Utah does not allow anyone to file a petition to expunge an arrest record
until at least thirty days after arrest. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-40-104(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2012).
Wyoming requires a 180-day waiting period after arrest. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-131401(a)(i) (2012).

358

SHLOSBERG ET AL.

[Vol. 104

at the time of filing, disqualifies an individual from receiving
expungement.23 Sometimes these wait periods can be quite long.24
The barriers to expungement can be so substantial that in some states,
merely showing that a criminal proceeding did not result in charges or
conviction is not enough. For example, in California exonerees may only
petition for sealing and destroying of their arrest or court records in cases
that ended without the filing of a plea, with the filing of a plea but without a
conviction, or with acquittal only after obtaining a determination of “factual
innocence” from the arresting criminal justice agency.25 If the criminal
justice agency does not grant the petitioner’s request, he must petition the
court for such a finding by showing that “no reasonable cause exists to
believe that the arrestee committed the offense for which the arrest was
made.”26 Simply stated, in California one must be not only “not guilty” but
“factually innocent” to get an arrest record expunged. In other states,
petitioners are at the whim of the system. In Delaware, for example, if a
misdemeanor charge or violation is “terminated in favor of the accused”
and the person has no prior convictions, then the record of the arrest is
subject to mandatory expungement.27 Everyone else must rely upon the
discretion of the Attorney General or the court.28 To secure discretionary
expungement, the petitioner must prove, based on a preponderance of the
evidence, a failure to expunge constitutes “manifest injustice.”29

23

In Maryland, for example, one must wait three years following an acquittal, a nolle
prosequi, or a dismissal before he or she can file for expungement. MD. CODE ANN. CRIM.
PROC. § 10-105(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2012). If the petitioner has served probation before
judgment or if the court has indefinitely postponed judgment in a case contingent on drug or
alcohol abuse treatment, the petitioner must wait until three years after the probation or
treatment was completed. Id. § 10-105(c)(2). If a person is convicted of a crime other than a
minor traffic violation within those three years, or has charges pending against him or her,
expungement will be denied. Id. § 10-105(c), (e)(4)(ii)(2).
24
Colorado, for example, requires individuals to wait ten years after the final disposition
of the case before filing for expungement, during which time the petitioner must not be
found guilty of another offense. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-308(1)(a)(III) (2012).
25
CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(a) (Deering 2013). In California, expunged records are first
sealed for three years before they are destroyed. Id.
26
Id. § 851.8(b).
27
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4373 (2012). In Delaware, a case is “terminated in favor of
the accused” if the defendant is acquitted, a prosecutor enters a nolle prosequi, or the case is
dismissed. Id. § 4372(b).
28
Id. § 4374.
29
Id. § 4374(c). For example, the existence of a prior conviction counts as prima facie
evidence against a petitioner’s claim. Id. Furthermore, Title 21 offenses are not eligible for
discretionary expungement. Id. § 4374(g). Title 21 offenses include, among others, the
following: (a) driving after judgment prohibited, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2810 (2012); (b)
reckless driving, id. § 4175; (c) operation of a motor vehicle causing death, id. § 4176A; (d)
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Most states make some provision for the expungement of convictions,
but the barriers remain formidable.30 Statutes that provide for this
possibility often apply only to those convicted of misdemeanors or minor
crimes.31 Where a provision is made to expunge the record of those who
commit more serious crimes, a full and unconditional pardon from the
Governor is sometimes required as a precondition.32 In deciding a petition
for expunging a conviction, a court generally weighs the interests of the
petitioner against those of society,33 or a court may be required to decide in
favor of the “public welfare”34 and may consider factors, such as the degree
of rehabilitation35 or “moral character” of the offender.36 As with the
expungement of arrest records, numerous exceptions, procedural
restrictions, and long waiting periods apply.37 Michigan, Utah, and
Wyoming, for example, mandate that petitioners wait a certain amount of
time before filing a petition, and they each exclude those with prior felony
convictions, those with charges pending at the time of the hearing, and
those who have already benefitted from the statute once already.38 Other
states have similar provisions.39 While most of these expungement
driving under the influence, id. § 4177; and (e) operating a commercial vehicle with a
prohibited blood alcohol concentration or while impaired by drugs, id. § 4177M.
30
In the case of felony convictions, though, one generally must go a long period of time
without a subsequent conviction. See Mouzon, supra note 4, at 33–34 & n.144.
31
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 431.076–.078 (LexisNexis 2012); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 44:9 (2012); see also Mouzon, supra note 4, at 32–33 & n.143.
32
In Delaware, Maryland, and West Virginia, a full and unconditional pardon
automatically qualifies a petitioner for a hearing but does not guarantee expungement;
furthermore, even with a pardon, the West Virginia statute excludes expungement of
convictions for murder, kidnapping, or treason. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4375 (2012); MD.
CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 10-105(a)(8)(ii) (LexisNexis 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-1-16a
(LexisNexis 2012).
33
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-14(b) (West 2013); see also Mouzon, supra note 4,
at 40 & n.155.
34
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 780.621(9) (LexisNexis 2012).
35
See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-71(2)(c) (2012).
36
See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.3-3(b)(1) (2012).
37
Usually, the wait period depends on the type of conviction. See Mouzon, supra note
4, at 38–39 nn.153–54.
38
Michigan, Utah, and Wyoming require wait periods of five, between three and ten
(depending on the type of crime), and ten years, respectively. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV.
§ 780.621(3); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-40-105(3)(C) (West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-131502 (2012). However, this rule does not seem to apply to those in Utah who benefitted
from a pardon before May 14, 2013. UTAH CODE. ANN. § 77-40-105(7) (West 2013).
39
New Jersey, for example, does not allow a person to file a petition while charges are
pending against him. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-13 (West 2013). Pennsylvania does not
allow the expungement of a conviction (assuming it was not for a summary offense) until
either the individual turns seventy (after a ten-year period without a conviction) or the person
has been dead for three years. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9122(b) (West 2012).
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proceedings rely on the discretion of the court, some statutes provide for
automatic or mandatory expungement of certain convictions.40 The
deficiencies of expungement statutes have been widely condemned in the
academic community.41
Similar statutes exist in the wrongful conviction realm. Eleven states
(not including those in our study) and the District of Columbia have
expungement statutes that are specifically tailored to the wrongfully
convicted.42 In its model legislation on compensation for the wrongfully
convicted, the Innocence Project includes a drafter’s note recommending
that states adopt expungement procedures that complement compensation
statutes.43 Such statutes offer perhaps the best hope for an exoneree seeking
to expunge a record of an erroneous conviction and start anew.44 The most

40

For example, in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Utah, a full and unconditional
pardon guarantees the expungement of records related to the case, notwithstanding any
limitations to the contrary. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-142a(2) (West 2012); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 127, § 152, ch. 258D, § 7 (LexisNexis 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-40-105
(LexisNexis 2012). In West Virginia, a nonexcluded misdemeanor committed between the
ages of eighteen and twenty-six years old is subject to automatic expungement if the
petitioner waits at least a year after conviction before filing for expungement and has no
prior felonies or pending charges. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-26 (LexisNexis 2012).
41
See, e.g., Henson, supra note 5, at 393 (arguing that most states fail to meet the
elements of a well-drafted expungement statute—“clearly defined key terms, specific
requirements for expungement, a delineation of the scope of courts’ authority to expunge,
rules for procedure, a statement of the effects of expungement, and an express or self-evident
policy rationale underlying expungement”); Mouzon, supra note 4, at 35–45 (proposing a
model federal expungement statute).
42
See infra notes 47–56 and accompanying text.
We include Connecticut,
Massachusetts, and Utah because although their statutes do not specifically mention
innocence, the relevant parts of their statutes would apply to every person pardoned on the
basis of innocence. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-142a(2); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 127,
§ 152, ch. 258D, § 7; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-40-105.
43
See INNOCENCE PROJECT, MODEL LEGISLATION: AN ACT CONCERNING CLAIMS FOR
WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND IMPRISONMENT 6–7 (2010), available at http://goo.gl/6AeVR4.
44
While typical postconviction expungement statutes provide a clean slate for those
guilty ex-convicts who are supposedly most likely to take advantage of them (e.g.,
nonviolent, one-time offenders who have gone long periods of time without recidivating, and
who have shown evidence of improvement), they may not aid the subjects of our study, few
of whom were convicted of misdemeanors. Even many of the statutes that allow for
expungement of felonies specifically rule out the types of crimes for which our participants
were convicted. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-1-16a(e) (LexisNexis 2012). Given that
most of the participants in our dataset were wrongfully convicted of serious crimes, such as
murder and rape, it is equally unlikely that many would successfully have their records
expunged under statutes that dictate expungement of juvenile records. Even if an exoneree
was a minor when convicted, many of these statutes would still preclude the expungement of
violent or sexual offenses. See, e.g., LA. CHILD CODE ANN. art. 918(C)(1) (2012); see also
Snow, supra note 6, at 39–40. Of course, the population of exonerated individuals (the
population in our study) is not necessarily representative of those wrongfully convicted in
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inclusive of these statutes allow for expungement of a criminal record for
anybody who receives either a pardon or a court finding of actual
innocence.45 Other states force exonerees to rely on either a pardon or a
judicial determination alone, or include more restrictions on how they may
obtain relief. For example, the District of Columbia provides a means
through which a court can set aside a wrongful conviction and seal the
records pertaining to it, but the statute makes no mention of executive
pardons.46 On the other hand, Connecticut47 and Utah48 guarantee
expungement based on absolute pardons but make no specification for those
whose convictions are vacated or set aside by a court. The same is true for
those in Tennessee whose pardons, furthermore, must be based on actual
innocence.49 In North Carolina50 and Oklahoma,51 one may rely upon a
pardon based on actual innocence or a court order of innocence, but the
latter must be proven by DNA. Similarly, Missouri,52 Ohio,53 and
Wyoming54 only allow expungements of wrongful convictions on the basis
of DNA exoneration.
In addition, seven states include provisions that do not specifically
mention innocence but could possibly be applied to the actually innocent.
Oregon, for example, allows a judge to order any relief deemed to be
“proper and just.”55 Pennsylvania law provides a means for postconviction
testing of DNA and allows a judge to order postconviction relief in the form

general (because resources are not usually directed toward less dire cases), so many
individuals who were wrongfully convicted for, or perhaps even exonerated of, minor crimes
or misdemeanors could arguably benefit from a postconviction expungement statute that
does not focus on innocence. However, even if it were possible for certain wrongfully
convicted individuals to take advantage of postconviction expungement statutes designed for
the guilty, it would still put them in the awkward position of having to implicitly admit guilt
for crimes they did not commit to expunge their records of these very same crimes.
45
While Massachusetts mentions only a full and unconditional pardon, Virginia specifies
that a pardon be based on actual innocence. Compare MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 127, § 152, ch.
258D, § 7; with VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-392.2 (2012).
46
D.C. CODE § 16-802 (LexisNexis 2012).
47
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-142a(2).
48
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-40-105 (LexisNexis 2012).
49
Tennessee law requires that the Governor first grant an “exoneration,” which is
essentially an absolute pardon based on innocence. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-27-109(a) (2012)
(“The governor may grant exoneration to any person whom the governor finds did not
commit the crime for which the person was convicted.”).
50
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-148 (2013).
51
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 18(3)–(4) (West 2012).
52
MO. ANN. STAT. § 650.058(4) (West 2012).
53
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.57(A) (LexisNexis 2013).
54
See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-12-310(c)(iii), (d)(ii) (2012).
55
See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138.520 (West 2011).
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of “other matters that are necessary and proper.”56 Rhode Island also
provides a means for postconviction testing of DNA evidence57 and
expungement of criminal records for persons “acquitted” or “otherwise
exonerated.”58 The statute does not define the term “exonerated,” but the
examples it gives (“dismissal,” filing of a “no true bill,” or “no
information”) seem to suggest that it refers to situations in which someone
is arrested or charged, but no conviction results.59 Wisconsin likewise
allows a petitioner to file a motion for postconviction testing of DNA
evidence;60 if the testing supports a petitioner’s claim, then the court may
order a hearing and thereafter “enter any order that serves the interests of
justice.”61 Alabama62 and Georgia63 allow records to be modified or
expunged based on “inaccurate or incomplete” information.64 Alaska
allows for expungement under circumstances of “mistaken identity or false
accusation.”65 Illinois,66 Oklahoma,67 and Virginia68 include provisions for
those whose records mistakenly contain convictions resulting from identity
theft.
B. STATES IN OUR STUDY

For reasons discussed infra, we included four states in our study: New
York, Florida, Illinois, and Texas.69 New York law permits sealing cases
where charges have been dismissed, vacated, set aside, not filed, or
otherwise terminated.70 An individual convicted of a minor drug crime who
has completed a prescribed treatment program may also petition to have the

56

See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9543.1, 9546 (West 2012).
See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-9.1-11 (2012).
58
See id. § 12-1-12.
59
See id.
60
See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 974.07 (West 2012).
61
Id. § 974.07(10)(a).
62
ALA. CODE § 41-9-645 (LexisNexis 2012).
63
See GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-37 (2012).
64
For a discussion of Alabama’s statute, see generally Henson, supra note 5.
65
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.62.180(b) (2012) (providing a remedy in the case of
“mistaken identity or false accusation”).
66
See 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2630/5.2(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2012).
67
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 18(12) (West 2012).
68
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-392.2(B) (2012).
69
See infra note 99.
70
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.50(1) (McKinney 2011). After such termination of the
case, the individual may petition the court to seal the record, and the petition will be granted
unless, within five days of the filing, the “district attorney demonstrates to the satisfaction of
the court that the interests of justice require otherwise.” Id. § 160.50(4).
57
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records relating to the offense conditionally sealed.71 Although the statute
does not mention innocence directly, New York law provides a legal avenue
for an exoneree seeking to seal records of a wrongful conviction. An
exoneree may file a motion to vacate a judgment after the discovery of new
evidence, which if successful, would lead to sealing of the conviction.72 It
is unclear if there are any sure methods for sealing a record other than
vacating a sentence. A gubernatorial pardon based on actual innocence
mandates “setting aside” a conviction, provided that the evidence was
discovered after the time of conviction and after it is too late for the
exoneree to file a motion for a new trial on the basis of new evidence.73
While a pardon would only “set aside” a conviction and not vacate it, such a
pardon would “place the defendant in the same position as if the indictment,
information or complaint had been dismissed at the conclusion of the trial
by the court because of the failure to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.”74 Following the sealing of records, New York law
orders destruction of all photographs or fingerprints taken from the
individual,75 along with any DNA samples that were collected.76 The
individual also regains any legal rights or privileges he lost as a result of
arrest and prosecution, is not disqualified from pursuing any profession, and
need not divulge any information about the sealed arrest or conviction.77
In Florida, a releasee must first obtain a certificate of eligibility to
petition the court to expunge or seal his record.78 Under Florida law, an
“expunction” entails physical destruction of records,79 while “sealing”
merely makes them confidential.80 A court may order arrest or conviction
records to be sealed but generally may expunge only arrest records.81

71

If after the records are sealed the individual is charged with another offense that does
not terminate in his favor, the court will unseal the previously sealed records. N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 160.58(8) (McKinney 2012).
72
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10 (1)(g)–(g-1) (McKinney 2013).
73
See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 19 (McKinney 2012); see also Lyons v. Goldstein, 47 N.E.2d
425, 429–30 (N.Y. 1943); People ex rel. Prisament v. Brophy, 38 N.E.2d 468, 471 (N.Y.
1941); Roberts v. State, 54 N.E. 678, 679 (N.Y. 1899).
74
See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 19.
75
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.50 (McKinney 2011).
76
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-c(9)(a) (McKinney 2013).
77
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.60 (McKinney 2013).
78
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0585 (West 2013) (expungement); id. § 943.059 (sealing). The
certificate of eligibility does not guarantee expungement or sealing; it merely qualifies one for a
hearing. See Frequently Asked Questions, FLA. DEP’T L. ENFORCEMENT, http://goo.gl/fcC1yd (last
visited Apr. 17, 2014).
79
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0585(4).
80
Id. § 943.059(4).
81
Id.
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Specifically, the court may expunge records in cases where the charge did
not end in conviction, or the arrest was mistaken or illegal.82 The statutes
governing both record sealing and expunging contain a list of offenses that
are ineligible. Each also excludes those who have prior convictions or
previously had records expunged or sealed.83 Whether he is seeking
expungement or sealing, the petitioner must pay a $75 fee.84 Although
these statutes typically do not provide expunction to those with a
conviction, a law became effective in 2008 that allows wrongfully
incarcerated individuals to file a claim for compensation.85 Everybody
entitled to compensation under this law is also entitled to expunction of
their records relating to the wrongful conviction.86 This expunction is not
subject to any of the limitations or fees that would otherwise normally
apply.87 Following expunction, all records relating to the offense are
destroyed, and the individual may legally deny the existence of his criminal
record, except under special circumstances such as if he applies to the
Florida bar or for a position in a criminal justice agency.88
Illinois also has separate procedures for expungement and sealing.
“Expungement” refers to the destruction of records, while “sealing”
preserves physical and electronic copies that may be reopened at a future
date.89 One may petition to have an arrest record or charges expunged if he
has no prior convictions, and the case against him ended in acquittal,
dismissal, release with no charges being filed, or vacation or reversal of the
sentence.90 However, some convictions, such as those for certain sexual
and violent offenses and minor traffic violations, are ineligible for
expungement.91 If the case against the petitioner did not end in conviction,
the records may be sealed, regardless of prior offending, and certain
records, even if they ended in conviction, may be sealed as well.92 The
petitioner is liable for any costs associated with expungement or sealing.93
82

See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0581 (West 2013).
Id. § 943.0585(1).
84
Id. §§ 943.0585(2)(b), 943.059(2)(b).
85
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 961.06 (West 2013).
86
Id. § 961.06(1)(e).
87
Id.
88
Id. § 943.0585(4).
89
20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2630/5.2(a)(1)(E), (K) (West 2013).
90
Id. § 2630/5.2(b)(1).
91
Id. § 2630/5.2(a)(3).
92
See id. § 2630/5.2(c). Interestingly, Illinois’s expungement statute also directed the
Illinois Department of Corrections to conduct a study on the effect of sealing, especially on
employment and recidivism rates, using a random sample of those who applied to have their
records sealed. Id. § 2630/5.2(f). We found no evidence that the study has been completed.
93
Id. § 2630/5.2(d)(10).
83
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Further, records can be unsealed upon a showing of good cause.94
Notwithstanding these provisions, if one obtains a pardon from the
Governor that specifically orders expungement, or if the conviction was set
aside and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant is factually innocent of the charge, the court will direct the
arresting authority to expunge its records. Following such a pardon or
reversal based on actual innocence, any DNA records maintained by the
criminal justice system will also be destroyed.95
Finally, Texas law guarantees a “right” to have one’s records
expunged if he is acquitted or pardoned for any reason. This right extends
to a petitioner who is released from charges or otherwise not tried, but the
petitioner may have to wait a predetermined amount of time, depending on
the charge, before he can file a motion for expungement. However, one
may not seek expungement for a charge or conviction that stemmed from an
incident during which another crime occurred and for which the petitioner
does not contest his guilt. In 2011, the Texas legislature amended the
statute to apply to those found actually innocent through either a court order
or pardon, although the latter seems redundant.96 Texas law forbids the
“release, maintenance, dissemination, or use of the expunged records and
files for any purpose” and allows the individual to deny the existence of the
arrest or conviction except when asked about it in court, at which point he
may respond that it has been expunged.97
II. METHODOLOGY
The current study is part of a larger project on post-exoneration
offending, which seeks to examine the post-release offending behavior of
wrongfully convicted individuals. The exonerees’ legal histories were
obtained through the Center on Wrongful Convictions (CWC) at the Bluhm
Legal Clinic at Northwestern University School of Law. We restricted our
focus to individuals released between 1999 and 2009 because complete
criminal record information is only available from 1999 onward, and with
respect to the end date, to allow at least three years for adequate follow-up.
The dataset was compiled from exonerations from the four leading
exoneration states for which criminal history data is publicly available:
Illinois, Florida, New York, and Texas. Cost limitations restricted criminal
history searches to four states. The top seven exoneration states in order
are: Illinois, New York, Texas, California, Louisiana, Massachusetts, and
94
95
96
97

See id. § 2630/5.2(e); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-5-4(b) (West 2010).
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4-3(f-1).
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01 (West 2012).
Id. art. 55.03.
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Florida.98
Criminal history data from California, Louisiana, and
Massachusetts are not publicly available. Florida was thus included in the
study. It also so happens that Illinois, New York, Texas, and Florida have
compensation statutes.99
In Florida, a wrongfully convicted individual found innocent by a
prosecuting attorney or administrative court judge is entitled to $50,000
(adjusted for cost-of-living increases) annually, up to a maximum of $2
million, as long as he has no prior felony convictions.100 He is also entitled
to 120 hours of tuition at a career center, community college, or state

98
Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 541 (2005).
99
As we note below in our Conclusion, discussing the limitations and directions for
future research, it would be interesting to compare post-exoneration behavior between
exonerees in states without any compensation statutes. That research would be challenging,
though, as exonerations are heavily concentrated in states with compensation statutes. More
than 40% of exonerations occur in the top four states, and the top ten states account for more
than two-thirds of American exonerations. Gross et al., supra note 98, at 541. It is also
noteworthy that the two leading exoneration states, Illinois and New York, are home to the
two largest and best-established U.S. organizations that work to identify false convictions
and obtain exonerations: the CWC at Northwestern University School of Law in Chicago
and the Innocence Project at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in New York City. While
these groups do offer some services following release, they do not have any established
mechanisms to assist exonerees with expungement. The Innocence Project has two social
workers on staff “who help the wrongly convicted adjust to free society” and “work to offer
other vital necessities” by providing direct services to clients in need of assistance after their
release. After Exoneration, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://goo.gl/eXkH8K (last visited Apr. 17,
2014). The CWC does not appear to offer after-care services at this time. Assistance and
Resources, CENTER ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, http://goo.gl/9nkr3z (last visited Apr. 17,
2014). Florida and Texas have innocence projects, though they are not nearly as active. The
Innocence Project of Florida’s mission statement suggests that it provides transitional and
after-care services to exonerees, and it has one social worker on staff; however, it does not
specify if it assists with expungement. About the Innocence Project of Florida, INNOCENCE
PROJECT FLA., http://goo.gl/3Qk7ig (last visited Apr. 17, 2014). The Innocence Project of
Texas is dedicated to securing release for those wrongfully convicted of crimes and
educating the public about the causes and effects of wrongful convictions. Who We Are,
INNOCENCE PROJECT TEX., http://goo.gl/JlTIAB (last visited Apr. 17, 2014).
The
organization’s website does not indicate that it currently offers after-care services. Id. In
considering whether this is a limitation of the research, it is worth noting that almost all
states have innocence projects (or comparable agencies). Innocence Network Member
Organizations, INNOCENCE NETWORK, http://goo.gl/AU1Xwt (last visited Apr. 17, 2014)
(listing states with innocence projects where only Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, and New
Jersey are not listed, South Carolina offers “no coverage,” and Oregon and Tennessee do not
have active agencies). Currently, Oregon and Tennessee are the only states that do not have
active agencies that focus on wrongful convictions while South Carolina offers “no
coverage.” Id.
100
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 961.06(1) (West 2012).

2014] EXPUNGEMENT AND POST-EXONERATION OFFENDING

367

university and reimbursement for any fines or costs imposed at the time of
his sentence.101 This law was effective in 2008.102
In Illinois, exonerees who have been granted a pardon by the Governor
or a certificate of innocence by a circuit court are eligible for compensation
up to the following: $85,350 for those who served up to five years,
$170,000 for those who served between five and fourteen years, and
$199,150 for those who served more than fourteen years.103 The law also
reimburses attorney’s fees up to 25% of the compensation award, and
provides job search and placement services and reentry services.104
The New York statute, which was made effective in 1984 and
amended in 2007, includes several complex provisions. Under the statute, a
judge reads the facts in the case and, if the lawsuit is contested by the state,
determines whether the facts fit the law’s criteria.105 If the judge so
determines, the state tends to settle the claim rather than proceed with a
potentially lengthy trial.106 Some other provisions include the following: If
the wrongfully convicted person “did not by his own conduct cause or bring
about his conviction” and files a claim within two years of his pardon of
innocence, he shall receive “damages in such sum of money as the court
determines will fairly and reasonably compensate him.”107 One unique and
beneficial provision allows the Court of Claims to award any amount—
there is no floor or ceiling.108
In Texas, unlike past lump-sum payments, a new law declares that
compensation come through monthly payments, with an upfront lump sum
and an annuity that can pass through a recipient’s estate.109 Additionally,
the Act states that a wrongfully convicted person is entitled to $80,000 per
year of wrongful incarceration and $25,000 per year spent on parole or as a
registered sex offender.110 The wrongfully convicted person is also entitled
to compensation for child support payments, tuition for up to 120 hours at a
101

Id.
Id.
103
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8 (West 2010).
104
Id.; see also 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1015/2 (Supp. 2013).
105
N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b (McKinney 2007).
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 103.001; 103.052; 103.053 (West 2012). The
name of the statute was changed in 2009 from The Wrongful Imprisonment Act to the Tim
Cole Act (named after Timothy Cole, the state’s first posthumous pardon), and it established
the Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions. See Press Release, Sen.
Rodney Ellis, Senate Passes Tim Cole Act to Improve Compensation for Wrongfully
Convicted and Their Families (May 11, 2009), available at http://goo.gl/yWpbKo.
110
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 103.052(a)(1), (b); 103.053.
102
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career center or public institution of higher learning, reentry and
reintegration services, and the opportunity to buy into the state employee
health plan.111 This statute was amended to include a provision that does
not allow payments to anyone who served time for a wrongful conviction at
the same time he or she was serving out a legitimate sentence for which he
or she would have been in prison anyway.112
Generally, determining innocence is an extremely lengthy process.
Innocent defendants with relatively short prison sentences are released long
before innocence can be determined. Thus, most exonerees in our study
were subject to long prison terms prior to their determinations of innocence.
Inclusion criteria for CWC exoneration cases include the following: cases
in which a sentence was long enough to be reviewed on appeal, cases that
have been reviewed, and cases that have available exculpatory evidence.
The current study also included cases that do not involve DNA.
Furthermore, seventeen of the cases from Texas derived from a single mass
exoneration in Tulia, Texas.113 These cases form a distinct subset, as they
were not individualized exonerations.
We obtained post-exoneration offending data through background
checks provided by Maximum Reports, Inc., a commercial data supplier.114
111

See id. §§ 103.001(d); 103.052(b); 103.054.
See id. § 103.001(b).
113
Dates of birth and other identifying information were not available for the other
twenty-one Tulia exonerees. Inclusion of the Tulia cases does not affect our findings with
respect to expungement effects. Although we chose to include the Tulia exonerees, other
researchers have made a different choice. See Gross et al., supra note 98, at 535 (“We do
not include [the Tulia exonerees] here because the processes that produced the false
convictions and the mass exonerations in these singular episodes are fundamentally different
from those in the individual cases on which we focus . . . .”).
114
Recidivism research often uses rap sheets as sources of criminal history background
information, but for a variety of substantive and practical reasons, conviction records
obtained by a commercial data provider were the more appropriate sources here. The
principal substantive reason is that employers sometimes use commercial data providers to
obtain information about prospective employees. Michael A. Stoll & Shawn D. Bushway,
The Effect of Criminal Background Checks on Hiring Ex-Offenders 9 (Nat’l Poverty Ctr.,
Working Paper Series No. 07-08, 2007), available at http://goo.gl/Ejfmha. Our research
thus accurately models the way that those persons and institutions that rely on criminal
records may perceive them. Our research also focuses on conviction records, which can be
drawn from courtroom records, rather than arrest records, which are only evident from rap
sheets. The principal practical consideration is that rap sheets can only be accessed with
fingerprints or a prison identification number (i.e., NYSID number in New York State). See,
e.g., Inmate Lookup Instructions, DEP’T CORRS. & CMTY. SUPERVISION, http://goo.gl/ts3M6y
(last visited Apr. 17, 2014). This information was not contained in the CWC data. Also, in
instances where the individual had no record prior to his wrongful conviction and the
wrongful conviction was expunged, no prison identifier exists. When considering the
limitations of relying upon a commercial data provider as a potential limitation of the study,
it is important to note research showing that courtroom data underreports offending and that
112
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Maximum Reports, Inc., like all commercial data suppliers, requires an
“identifier”—typically a date of birth or Social Security number.115 CWC
case histories included such an identifier in approximately one-third of its
cases. In thirteen cases, an exoneree had returned to prison, and the
identifier was obtainable from the state correctional department. For the
remaining cases, we conducted independent searches.116 We excluded all
cases for which we failed to find an identifier. Thus, the number of cases
included in the study was significantly smaller than the pool CWC
provided.117 The final set included 118 exoneration cases. These included
thirty-one exoneration cases from Illinois, seventeen from Florida, twentyfour from New York, and forty-six from Texas.
Each CWC exoneration history contains specific information
regarding the exoneration, including a case chronology, legal citations, and
original case materials. This allows for evaluating of various aspects of the
exonerations and their potential links to post-exoneration offending. All of
the included cases were coded for the following independent variables:








sex,
age at time of arrest,
age at time of release,
race,
number and nature of prior offenses
(if any),
nature of the offense that brought
about the erroneous conviction,
factors leading to the erroneous
conviction (false eyewitness
testimony, false confession, etc.),






evidence (DNA or non-DNA),
expungement status (whether there
is any evidence of the wrongful
conviction on record),
procedural posture of the
exoneration (for example, executive
pardon), and
compensation.

there is no evidence of false positives using this method. See WILL NAGEL & CHRIS
HUMBLE, ILL. INTEGRATED JUSTICE INFO. SYS., COMPARISON OF OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL
SOURCES OF CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD INFORMATION 2–3 (2005). If anything, using
courtroom data underreports the incidences of offending after release from incarceration.
115
See Pricing, MAXIMUM REP., http://goo.gl/MtRnuu (last visited Apr. 14, 2014)
(providing Maximum Reports, Inc. pricing requirements and state-specific information on
inclusion).
116
We used several different sources to obtain these records, including sex offender
registries, attorney contacts, recorded court decisions, Westlaw, LexisNexis, social media
websites, and general Internet search engines. Finding identifiers is the distinctive challenge
of this research. For current prisoners, the identifiers are generally available from state
correctional departments. For all but the thirteen individuals who had returned to prison for
a new offense, this was not a viable option.
117
CWC had records of 196 known exonerations in Florida, Illinois, New York, and
Texas between 1999 and 2009. This included forty-four cases in Illinois, nineteen cases in
Florida, forty-nine cases in New York, and eighty-four cases in Texas. If a case identifier
was located, that case was included in the study.
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The dependent variable, post-exoneration offending, was measured
dichotomously (yes or no) and continuously (number of offenses).
Unfortunately, some states only publicize reconviction and resentencing
data, thereby omitting rearrest data, an important variable in recidivism
research. Our study used only reconviction as an indicator of postexoneration offending. In addition to the number of post-exoneration
offenses, we also measured the amount of time between release and postexoneration offending, and the type of post-exoneration offense.
In a separate article, we analyzed the effect of compensation on postexoneration offending.118
In sum, we found that substantial
compensation—defined as greater than $500,000—was associated with a
significant reduction in offending.119 Our focus here is the consequences of
expungement.
III. RESULTS
A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Table 1 presents simple descriptive statistics. Sixty-seven (56.8%) of
the exonerees in the study were African-American, thirty-four (28.8%) were
white, and fourteen (11.9%) were Hispanic. The remaining two exonerees
were coded as “Other.” All but five exonerees were male, and the average
exoneree was approximately twenty-seven years old at arrest, with ages at
arrest ranging from twelve to fifty-seven. The average age at release was
thirty-nine. The youngest releasee was nineteen. The oldest was sixty-two.
More than one-third of the exonerees included in the study were from Texas
(n = 46), a quarter were from Illinois (n = 31), about 20% were from New
York (n = 24), and the remaining 14% (n=17) were from Florida.
Sixty-seven (56.8%) exonerees were convicted of at least one crime
prior to the crime for which they were wrongfully convicted. Fifty (42.4%)
exonerees in the study had no prior record. The average number of prior
convictions was just under two. Seventy-four (62.7%) of the exonerees
were sentenced to a custodial or prison term. Twenty-two (18.6%) were
sentenced to life without parole (LWOP). Seventeen (14.4%) were
sentenced to death, four (3.4%) received a noncustodial sentence, and one
case was missing from the analysis. Forty-five (38.1%) exonerees in our
study had a post-exoneration conviction.120 Consistent with prior research,

118
See Evan J. Mandery et al., Compensation Statutes and Post-exoneration Offending,
103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 553, 553 (2013).
119
See id.
120
Among those who had a post-exoneration offense, nineteen (42.2%) offended within
the first two years of their release.
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the average exoneree in the study spent more than eleven years in prison, as
measured from the date of conviction to the date of release.121 The
maximum term of incarceration was almost twenty-seven years. Almost
half of the cases in our dataset were non-DNA exoneration cases (49.2%).
The average time between release and PEO—35.1 months
(SD = 31.2)—was consistent with prior recidivism research. Seventy-one
exonerees (61.2%) received compensation and forty-five exonerees (38.8%)
had not at the time of coding. Forty-nine exonerees (41.5%) were granted
an executive pardon, a method through which an executive authority legally
forgives someone for a crime and reinstates rights lost postconviction,
whereas fifty-seven exonerees (48.3%) were not.122 Overall, seventy-nine
exonerees (66.9%) had their records expunged (wherein the wrongful
conviction did not appear on the record). Thirty-eight individuals (32.2%)
had not received an expungement at the time of coding. Table 2 presents
the bivariate correlations among various independent variables and the sole
dependent variable used in the analyses (post-exoneration offending).

121
See Gross et al., supra note 98, at 524 (explaining that the exonerees in that study
spent an “average of more than ten years each” wrongfully incarcerated). The Innocence
Project reports that among those persons who were wrongfully convicted and who are later
exonerated through postconviction DNA testing, the average person spent more than thirteen
years in prison.
Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://goo.gl/ETffcc (last visited Apr. 17, 2014).
122
For this variable, data were missing for eleven cases (9.3%).
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Gender
Male
Female
Race
African-American
White
Hispanic
Other
State
Florida
Illinois
New York
Texas
Age at Arrest
Age at Release
Prior Conviction(s)
No
Yes
Number of Prior Convictions
Sentence
LWOP
Death
Custodial
Non-custodial
Post-exoneration Offense
No
Yes
Number of Post-exoneration Offense(s)
DNA Exoneration
No
Yes
Time Incarcerated (Years)
Time Between Release and PEO (Months)
Compensation
No
Yes
Pardon
No
Yes
Expungement
No
Yes

N

%

113
5

95.8
4.2

67
34
14
2

56.8
28.8
11.9
1.9

17
31
24
46

14.4
26.3
20.3
39.0

50
67

Mean

SD

26.8
39.1

7.9
9.9

42.4
56.8
1.7

22
17
74
4

18.6
14.4
62.7
3.4

73
45

61.9
38.1

58
60

2.4

.98

1.8

11.2
35.1

7.1
31.2

49.2
50.8

45
71

38.8
61.2

57
49

48.3
41.5

38
79

32.2
66.9
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Table 2
Zero-Order Pearson Correlation Matrix
Record
Age at
Prior Number
Expunged Exoneration of Convictions
Age at Exoneration
(Years)
Prior Number of
Conviction
Compensation
(>500K)
Race (White)

Compensation Race
Time Out
(>500K)
(White) (Years)

.027
-.257**

.248**

.106

.169

-.202*

-.046

-.090

.125

.102

Time Out (Years)
-.059
Post-exoneration
-.177
Offending
**
p< 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*
p< 0.05 level (2-tailed).

-.147

.151

-.154

.207*

-.193*

.287**

-.242*

.186*

.045

B. POST-EXONERATION OFFENDING

Table 3 presents data on post-exoneration offending. Forty-five
(38.1%) exonerees in our study were convicted of at least one crime after
they were released. Seventy-three (61.9%) exonerees in the cohort did not
offend post-exoneration. Offending rates varied by state. Florida had the
highest rate of post-exoneration offending at 58.8%. New York had the
lowest rate at 8.3%. Note that New York had both the most generous
compensation statute123 and the most favorable expungement laws.
Table 3
Post-exoneration Offending by State
State
Texas
Illinois
New York
Florida
Total N

%
Yes
45.7
38.7
8.3
58.8
45

No
54.3
61.3
91.7
41.2
73

N
46
31
24
17
118

We coded post-exoneration offenses as either violent (aggravated
assault, battery, involuntary manslaughter, or child abuse), property-related

123

New York’s compensation statute has a provision that allows the court of claims to
award any amount; there is no floor or ceiling. See 2007 N.Y. Laws 2889–90. For example,
in 2011, Steven Barnes was awarded $3.5 million for the nineteen years he spent behind
bars. Court of Claims Awards $3.5 Million to Steven Barnes for Wrongful Conviction,
WKTV NEWS CHANNEL 2 (Jan. 7, 2011, 4:13 PM), http://goo.gl/P6NugM.
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(burglary, theft, larceny, breaking and entering, shoplifting, or drugrelated), or other (gambling, probation violation, giving false information,
driving without a license, resisting arrest, interfering with an emergency
call, obstruction of justice, reckless conduct, or an equipment violation). As
Table 4 displays, among the forty-five exonerees who offended following
their releases, twenty committed a violent offense, thirteen committed a
property crime, twenty committed a drug offense, and sixteen committed an
offense classified as “other.” Several of the exonerees committed multiple
offenses.
Table 4
Type of Post-exoneration Offense
Offense Type
Violent
Property
Drug
Other

Yes
%
16.9
11.0
16.8
13.6

N
20
13
20
16

No
%
83.1
88.1
82.2
83.9

N
98
104
97
99

C. EXPUNGEMENT

Overall in the criminal history searches, seventy-nine exonerees
(67.5%) had their records expunged. Thirty-eight individuals (32.5%) had
not received an expungement at the time of coding.124 Table 5 displays
expungement by state. All individuals exonerated in New York (n = 24)
had the record of their wrongful convictions expunged. Texas had the
highest number (n = 17) of cases without expungements. This disparity is
likely due to differences in state expungement statutes as detailed in
Part I.125

124
Among these thirty-eight cases, twelve exonerees (31.5%) had the wrongful
conviction still on their records in their entireties. The remainder of these cases (n = 26,
68.4%) had the wrongful conviction on their records; however their records stated that the
cases were either dismissed, pardoned, vacated, or charges were dropped. These cases were
included in the “no expungement” group, because no indication of the crime should remain
on an exoneree’s record for the crime to be considered expunged or “erased.”
125
See the survey of state expungement practices supra in Part I.
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Table 5
Expungement by State
State
Texas
Illinois
New York
Florida
Total N

%
Yes
N=29
36.7
N=20
25.3
N=24
30.4
N=6
7.6
79
67.5%

No
N=17
44.7
N=11
26.3
N=0
0.0
N=11
28.7
38
32.5%

N
46
39.3%
31
25.7%
20.5%
24
14.5%
17
117

Table 6 displays the relationship between post-exoneration offending
and expungement. Expungement is significantly associated with postexoneration offending. Among the thirty-eight exonerees who did not have
records of their wrongful convictions expunged, 50% committed PEOs.
Among the seventy-nine who had their records expunged, only 31.6%
offended. The difference was significant at the .05 level.
Table 6
Bivariate Analysis of PEO by Expungement
Post-exoneration
Offense
No %
Yes %
Total N
χ2 (1)= 3.684, p<.05

Expungement
No
Yes
%
N
%
50.0 19 68.4
50.0 19 31.6
38

N
54
25
79

Total
73
44
117

The relationship between expungement and post-exoneration
offending is complicated, however, by the fact that having a record prior to
wrongful conviction is both a predictor of post-exoneration offending and a
legal barrier to expungement in many states, including Florida and
Illinois.126 Even where it is not a legal barrier, it is a practical barrier.127
126

See supra text accompanying notes 18–41 (general barriers), 78–88 (Florida), and
89–95 (Illinois). However, it is possible that many of the exonerees in our study did not
benefit from these specifications. In Florida, the law that explicitly exempts exonerees from
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Indeed, in our study, as Table 7 reflects, 78.9% of those without an
expungement had a prior record.128
Table 7
Cross-tabulation of Expungement and Prior Record
Prior record
No %
Yes %
Total N
χ2 (1)= 11.205,
p<.01

Expungement
No
Yes
%
N %
21.1 8
53.8
78.9 30 46.2
38

N
42
36
78

Total
50
66
116

For this reason, we examine separately the relationship of postexoneration offending and the expungement of wrongful convictions for
exonerees with and without prior convictions. We hypothesized that the
relationship would be different for the two groups of exonerees. For
exonerees with histories of offending, expungement of their wrongful
conviction still leaves them with a criminal history, albeit a shorter one.
Failure to expunge a wrongful conviction puts an exoneree with no prior
history in a categorically different position. Tables 8A and 8B support this

the normal barriers to expungement did not become effective until 2008. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 943.0585 (expungement) (West 2013); id. § 943.059 (sealing). While the relevant
section of Illinois’s statute has existed longer than Florida’s, it is still possible that exonerees
have not been benefitting from it. While there is always some degree of incongruity between
the intentions of a law and its application, there is reason to believe that this incongruity is
even more acute for Illinois expungement cases: Apparently, police departments across the
state have been regularly ignoring court orders to seal or expunge records, substituting their
own judgments for those of judges, and therefore preventing many who were legally entitled
to sealing or expungement from receiving it. See Kelly Virella, Closing Arguments: Refusal
by the Illinois State Police to Enforce Court Orders Hurts Those Who Are Trying to Get
Their Criminal Records Expunged or Sealed, CHI. REP., May/June 2009, at 10. This
prevented many who were legally entitled to sealing or expungement from receiving it. See
id. (“When a judge ordered the Illinois State Police to seal or expunge the records of an exoffender, sometimes it happened; sometimes it didn’t.”).
127
See SAUNDRA D. WESTERVELT & KIMBERLY J. COOK, LIFE AFTER DEATH ROW:
EXONEREES’ SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY AND IDENTITY 215 (2012). In their interviews with
death row exonerees, Westervelt and Cook found that without expungement, exonerees had
difficulty finding jobs. Id. at 65–66. Exonerees often need to engage legal assistance to
obtain an expungement, but they generally lack the funds to do so. Id. at 66.
128
For one case, we were unable to determine whether the subject had prior arrests or
not. This explains the disparity in the numbers between Table 5 and the earlier tables.

2014] EXPUNGEMENT AND POST-EXONERATION OFFENDING

377

hypothesis. Expungement decreases the likelihood of post-exoneration
offending for those with no prior history of offending.129
Table 8A displays post-exoneration offending and expungement
among those with no prior offending record. Among this subset, the
majority of individuals (87.5%) who did not have their records expunged
went on to commit at least one post-exoneration offense. As Table 8B
displays, the association between post-exoneration offending and
expungement is not significant among those with prior offenses.
Table 8A
PEO by Expungement for Exonerees with No Prior Offending
Post-exoneration
Offense
No %
Yes %

Expungement
%
No
Yes
12.5 83.3
87.5 16.7
8
42

N
36
14
50

Total N
χ2 (1)= 16.725, p=.000

Table 8B
Bivariate Analysis of PEO by Expungement
for Exonerees with Prior Offending
Expungement
Post-exoneration
Offense
No %
Yes %
Total N
χ2 (1)= .660, p>.05

%
No
60.0
40.0
30

Yes
50.0
50.0
36

N
36
30
66

Of course, expungement is not the only factor affecting the future
behavior of exonerees. Drawing on our prior research, we regressed postexoneration offending on a vector of predictors, including compensation
above a threshold amount, age, time since release, prior number of

129

Among the thirty individuals who had both a prior conviction and a post-exoneration
conviction, 30% (n = 9) committed crimes that were similar in nature.
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convictions, race, and whether wrongful convictions were expunged.130 We
exploited the fact that our data includes the number of future convictions
and not simply whether the exonerees offended post-release. Poisson
regression fits models where rare events are counted—in other words,
where there are a high proportion of zeroes and the frequency of events
drops sharply thereafter.131 In our study, roughly 62% of the exonerees
committed no post-exoneration offenses. Of those who did, most did so
one or two times. Taken together with those who never offend,
approximately 87% of the exonerated offended two or fewer times. Poisson
regression is thus highly appropriate.
Table 9 reports three Poisson models used to estimate the influence of
expungement on the number of future convictions.132 As the Table reveals,
all three models are significant.
Models 1 and 2 each explain
approximately 19% of the variance. Model 3 explains roughly 15% of the
variance. Models 1 and 3 include time since exoneration as a predictor,
which fails to reach significance in both models. Model 2 excludes a
predictor for time but does include a dichotomous variable for race where
the value “1” equals a “white” exoneree. Time since exoneration does not
appear to help in predicting post-exoneration offending—it fails to reach
significance in the two models in which it is included, and it does not
improve the model fit statistics or the amount of explained variance.

130
In an earlier article, the authors regressed post-exoneration offending on several
predictors, including compensation, above a threshold amount, age at release, and number of
prior convictions. See Mandery et al., supra note 118, at 568.
131
See generally JAMES S. COLEMAN, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY
(1964). Coleman developed this method of multivariate analysis. This statistical technique is
analogous to regression analysis when binary variables take the value 0 or 1 to indicate the
absence or presence of some categorical effect that may be expected to shift the outcome. Id.
132
The findings we report are tentative and somewhat fragile. We report them with
some degree of caution. Of particular concern is the issue of time. We use two different but
related measures. Based on the literature, we use age at release to capture the age–crime
relationship. We expect that older exonerees will be less likely to offend and accumulate
post-exoneration convictions. In all of the models, this is so. Although highly significant,
the coefficient itself is -.0001 across all three models. Time, measured as number of years
since the exoneration, is more problematic. In these data, the number of years since
exoneration ranges from roughly two years to eighteen years, with an average number of
years of 7.7. An additional challenge is that we know how many convictions each exoneree
has, but we do not know if those who were convicted were incarcerated at any given
moment. For those with post-exoneration convictions, we do not have a precise measure of
how long they had been out of prison and were therefore at risk to offend. It is thus
somewhat of a stretch to use time as a linear predictor. Nor can we use time as an exposure
against which we calculate incident rates. If we omit time, however, we are losing valuable
information and risk-omitted variable bias. Because time since exoneration is an important
element, we have chosen to include it in the first model, but we are cautious in the
interpretation.
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Unfortunately, we could only reject the influence of time if we had a better
measure of the actual time each exoneree was out in the public and
available to offend.133
It is no surprise that the prior number of offenses is a positive and
consistent predictor of post-exoneration offending. This finding is
consistent with our own prior research, as well as research on re-offending
generally, which suggests that prior criminal history is predictive of postrelease offending.134 Compensating the wrongfully convicted appears to
decrease post-exoneration offending.135 Expunging wrongful convictions
is, as we predicted, a significant predictive factor across all three models.
Tables 8A and 8B might suggest that some other variable is interfering for
those with no prior offenses and who had their wrongful convictions
expunged. However, doing so would torture the data and lead to small cell
values.

133

Ideally we would want to know how long each exoneree was out of prison and
therefore able to offend, but due to limitations in available data, we used time from
exoneration.
134
Of course, all of the available research concerns recidivism as opposed to post-release
offending. One of the most significant predictors of recidivism is having a prior record. See
ALLEN J. BECK & BERNARD E. SHIPLEY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983, at 2–3 (1989); PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 7–10
(2002); Daniel S. Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, 38 CRIME & JUST.: ANN. REV.
RES. 115, 135 (2009); Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, On the Relationship of Past
to Future Participation in Delinquency, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 163, 183 (1991).
135
See Mandery et al., supra note 118, at 573.

380

SHLOSBERG ET AL.

[Vol. 104

Table 9
Poisson Regression Analysis: Post-exoneration Offending by Expungement,
Age at Release, Prior Number of Convictions,
Compensation Amount, Race, and Years Since Release
Constant
Wrongful Conviction Expunged
Age at Exoneration (Years)
Prior Number of Offenses
Compensation at $500,000
White
Years Since Release

Model 1
1.7014
(0.611)
-0.5969
(0.229)
-0.0001
(0.000)
0.1399
(0.036)
-0.8966
(0.369)
-0.4421
(0.288)
0.0313
(0.028)

Model Statistics
N
104
Log Likelihood
-140.64
χ2
67.85
Pseudo R2
0.1943
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001;****p<.0001
Standard errors are in parentheses.

**
**
***
****
*

Model 2
2.0991
(0.446)
-0.6601
(0.213)
-0.0001
(0.000)
0.1530
(0.034)
-0.8167
(0.334)
-0.5514
(0.279)

****
***
****
****
*

Model 3
1.442
(0.580)
-0.5000
(0.224)
-0.0001
(0.000)
0.1522
(0.034)
-0.5075
(0.317)

*
*
***
****

*

0.0324
(0.027)

****

108
-145.50
71.29
0.1968

****

105
-151.33
55.28
0.1544

****

IV. DISCUSSION
A. LABELING THEORY

Our finding that failure to expunge an exoneree’s record is associated
with a significant increase in the risk of post-exoneration is consistent with
labeling theory. Developed by sociologists in the late 1960s, labeling
theory portrays criminality as a product of society’s reaction to the
individual.136 It contends that an individual who has been labeled has a

136

Howard Becker’s book Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance was
extremely influential in the development of labeling theory and is credited with its rise to
popularity. See generally HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF
DEVIANCE (1963). However, this idea began in the 1950s with the work of people like
Edwin Lemert, who focused on the symbolic interactionist approach to deviance, the way in
which negative labels are applied, and on the consequences of the labeling process. See
generally EDWIN M. LEMERT, SOCIAL PATHOLOGY: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO THE THEORY
OF SOCIOPATHIC BEHAVIOR (1951).
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transformation of identity.137 Following this logic, an individual who has
been convicted of a crime would acquire a criminal identity.
One aspect of the dynamic is transformational.
Deviant or
stigmatizing labels, such as “ex-convict,” can lead to depression,138 low
self-esteem,139 expected devaluation, discrimination, rejection,140 and
delinquent behavior.141
Another aspect of this dynamic is practical. The label of “ex-convict”
may contribute to people getting excluded from various activities that make
access to conventional activities more difficult and criminal alternatives
more attractive.142 For example, in some states, “convicted felons are
prohibited from obtaining student loans.”143 Denials of loans for schooling,
homes, and cars may further hinder exonerees’ successful reentry.144 A
criminal record also frustrates securing almost any service that requires an
application or a background check. Although public housing is a viable

137

Many early researchers studied self-esteem or “self-typing.” See generally Suzanne
S. Ageton & Delbert S. Elliott, The Effects of Legal Processing on Delinquent Orientations,
22 SOC. PROBS. 87 (1974); Leonard E. Gibbs, The Effects of Juvenile Legal Procedures on
Juvenile Offenders’ Self-Attitudes, 11 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 51 (1974). More recently,
researchers have conducted identity-related labeling research. See, e.g., Karen Heimer &
Ross L. Matsueda, Role Taking, Role Commitment, and Delinquency: A Theory of
Differential Social Control, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 365, 366 (1994); Ross L. Matsueda, Reflected
Appraisals, Parental Labeling, and Delinquency: Specifying a Symbolic Interactionist
Theory, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1577, 1578 (1992).
138
See Bruce G. Link et al., On Stigma and Its Consequences: Evidence from a Longitudinal
Study of Men with Dual Diagnoses of Mental Illness and Substance Abuse, 38 J. HEALTH SOC.
BEHAV. 177, 177 (1997); Tally Moses, Stigma and Self-Concept Among Adolescents Receiving
Mental Health Treatment, 79 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 261, 262 (2009).
139
Betsy L. Fife & Eric R. Wright, The Dimensionality of Stigma: A Comparison of its
Impact on the Self of Persons with HIV/AIDS and Cancer, 41 J. HEALTH SOC. BEHAV. 50,
52–53 (2000).
140
See Bruce G. Link et al., A Modified Labeling Theory Approach to Mental Disorders:
An Empirical Assessment, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 400, 402–03 (1989).
141
See generally Heimer & Matsueda, supra note 137, at 382; Matsueda, supra note 137,
at 1602.
142
See INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT 22 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); Bruce Western & Becky
Pettit, Black-White Wage Inequality, Employment Rates, and Incarceration, 111 AM. J. SOC.
553, 574 (2005) (discussing the broad range of consequences of imprisonment, which
presumes conviction); Bruce Western, The Impact of Incarceration on Wage Mobility and
Inequality, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 526, 528 (2002).
143
Ted Chiricos et al., The Labeling of Convicted Felons and Its Consequences for
Recidivism, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 547, 548 (2007).
144
For example, arrest and incarceration can temporarily affect a person’s government
benefits and eligibility for student loans in New York State. See KATE RUBIN ET AL., BRONX
DEFENDERS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CHARGES: A PEOPLE’S GUIDE 11 (2008),
available at http://goo.gl/HQ96EZ.
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option for individuals reentering the community, many find themselves
barred as a consequence of their criminal conviction.145 Obtaining private
housing brings its own challenges.146 Even if recent prison releasees can
afford private housing, background checks and the lack of credible work
histories may inhibit them.147
Ex-offenders also encounter obstacles that effectively bar them from
benefits of conventional society. They lose civil liberties, including the
right to vote and hold public office, and they lose access to government
benefits.148 They often are subject to bias from law enforcement officers.149
Moreover, a prior record sometimes acts as a barrier to securing
employment,150 including employment in state-licensed occupations or with

145

See JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER
REENTRY 121(2003) (“[S]ome laws now require public housing agencies and providers to
deny housing to certain felons (e.g., drug and sex offenders).”). Public housing law
currently requires public housing agencies and Section 8 voucher providers to deny housing
to those with drug-related criminal activity and any household with a member who is subject
to a lifetime registration requirement. See Housing Laws Affecting Individuals with Criminal
Convictions, LEGAL ACTION CTR., http://goo.gl/3T1Mkp (last visited Apr. 17, 2014). These
policies can have far-reaching effects; the public housing authority may evict all members of
a household for criminal activities committed by any one member in that household. See,
e.g., Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002).
146
Finding housing is one of the biggest challenges for people leaving prison. JEREMY
TRAVIS ET AL., URBAN INST., FROM PRISON TO HOME: THE DIMENSION AND CONSEQUENCES OF
PRISONER REENTRY 35 (2001). Some laws deny housing to certain felons, such as drug and
sex offenders. See LEGAL ACTION CTR, supra note 145. Individuals with drug-related felony
convictions are unable to receive federally funded public assistance (welfare) and food
stamps. See 21 U.S.C. § 862(a) (2012).
147
PETERSILIA, supra note 145, at 121 (“Even if the ex-prisoner can afford it, landlords
conducting background checks or requiring credible work histories usually pass over an
applicant with a prison record.”).
148
Id. at 130. See generally Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal
Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 941 (1970). Every state, besides Maine and Vermont,
has laws prohibiting prison inmates from voting. See CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, URBAN INST.,
PRISONER REENTRY AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY: BRIDGES AND BARRIERS TO
SUCCESSFUL REINTEGRATION—BARRIERS TO DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION 2 (2002). Some
states permanently deny the right to vote after a felony conviction, while others prevent
voting while on probation or parole. Id.
149
See Richard C. Smith et al., Background Information: Does It Affect the
Misdemeanor Arrest?, 4 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 111, 112–13 (1976).
150
PETERSILIA, supra note 145, at 117. In 2001, “Western, Kling, and Weiman found
that employers are less likely to hire ex-convicts [as compared to] those who provide no
information” (those who left the question blank) on their application forms. Id. at 116
(internal citations omitted). Harry Holzer et al. conducted a survey of 3,000 employers from
four large cities and similarly found that the majority of employers are unwilling to hire
applicants with a criminal record; 60% indicated that they would “probably not” or
“definitely not.” Harry J. Holzer et al., Will Employer’s Hire Ex-offenders? Employer
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state-licensed companies.151 This last consequence is arguably the most
significant. Jobs are essential for exonerees who are trying to rebuild their
lives. Finding and keeping work plays a crucial role in successful reentry
and reintegration.152
Employment also provides essential economic
security, which allows former prisoners to pay their bills, support their
families, obtain housing, and secure medical care. But while employment
is essential to rebuilding a life, individuals with criminal records experience
more difficulty obtaining employment than any other disadvantaged group,
including minorities, welfare recipients, and illegal aliens.153
Study after study shows how substantial these barriers to employment
are. For example, a national survey of 600 businesses showed that
employers shy away from hiring ex-convicts out of fear of liability if they
commit a new crime.154 Other researchers have found that employers are
less likely to hire an ex-convict than someone who provided no information
on his application regarding prior employment.155 A 2002 survey of 3,000
employers from four large cities similarly found that the majority of
employers are unwilling to hire an applicant with a criminal record.156 In
addition, these researchers found that approximately 49% of employers
“always” or “sometimes” checked potential employees’ criminal
backgrounds.157
Preferences, Background Checks, and Their Determinants 7 (Inst. Research on Poverty,
Discussion Paper No. 1243-02, 2002).
151
PETERSILIA, supra note 145, at 113–14.
152
See id. at 112 (“Employment helps ex-prisoners be productive, take care of their
families, develop valuable life skills, and strengthen their self-esteem and social
connectedness.”); see also CHRISTY VISHER ET AL., URBAN INST., EMPLOYMENT AFTER
PRISON: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF RELEASEES IN THREE STATES 8 (2008) (“The struggle to
find and keep a job after release is a crucial element of the reentry process. It is an important
part of becoming a productive member of the community and assists in developing personal
responsibility and gaining independence and self-reliance.”).
153
See HARRY J. HOLZER ET AL., URBAN INST., EMPLOYMENT DIMENSIONS OF REENTRY:
UNDERSTANDING THE NEXUS BETWEEN PRISONER REENTRY AND WORK—EMPLOYMENT
BARRIERS FACING EX-OFFENDERS 11 (2003). Employers are much more reluctant to hire exoffenders than any other group of disadvantaged workers. Id. Employers fear the legal
liability that could potentially be created by hiring ex-offenders, and they view their offender
status as a signal of lack of reliability and trustworthiness. Id. at 8.
154
PETERSILIA, supra note 145, at 117–18. Wirthlin Worldwide surveyed businesses
participating in Welfare to Work Partnership, a nonpartisan effort to assist businesses with
hiring people on public assistance. Id. at 117. The survey reported that those with a criminal
record were “hardest to serve,” and 40% of respondents reported that they would “never hire
anyone with a felony drug conviction.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
155
See Bruce Western et al., The Labor Market Consequences of Incarceration, 47
CRIME & DELINQ. 410, 412 (2001).
156
See Holzer et al., supra note 150, at 11 fig.3.
157
Id. at 11.
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While it is generally illegal for employers to ban hiring ex-offenders,
certain occupations that require occupational and professional licenses
mandate background checks for the safety of their clients158 and create yet
another barrier to successful reintegration. These barriers are common in
childcare, education, security, and nursing, among other fields.159 In New
York and other states, some occupations—including barbers, real estate
brokers, and physical therapists—require licenses that are predicated upon
the applicant being “morally sound.”160 Generally, evidence of a prior
conviction will act as a barrier to obtaining such a license.161 This
effectively bars individuals with criminal records from more than 100
professions in New York.162 Even outside of these occupations employers
may ask about prior felony convictions, even if they are not permitted to do
so.
In several respects, the barriers to employment are more difficult to
overcome for exonerees than ex-convicts. Of course, the most substantial
barrier to employment for ex-convicts is that they tend to lack education,
job skills, and general preparedness for the workplace.163 Yet—and this is
particularly cruel—exonerees are sometimes ineligible for job training and
vocational services that are made available to parolees.164 Even if an
exoneree’s record has been expunged, he generally has a long gap in his
employment history, which can discourage prospective employers.165 Our
findings were driven by the effects that failure to expunge had on the
exonerees who had no prior records. This is also consistent with research
on labeling theory, which suggests that labeling effects may be strongest for
first-time offenders.166 One explanation for this result may be that labeling

158

See PETERSILIA, supra note 145, at 113.
Id. These checks are especially troublesome for released offenders who previously
worked in these fields. They are completely cut off from returning to their former professions.
160
See ERNEST DRUCKER, A PLAGUE OF PRISONS: THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 135 (2011).
161
See id.
162
See id.
163
See HOLZER ET AL., supra note 153, at 4–5.
164
See Adrian Grounds, Psychological Consequences of Wrongful Conviction and
Imprisonment, 46 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 165, 170–71 (2004); see also JIM
DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT
RIGHT 289–90 (3d ed. 2003).
165
See Stephanie Armour, Wrongly Convicted Walk Away with Scars: DNA Testing
Leads to More Exonerations, but Those Freed Face Difficult Job Search and Get Little Help,
USA TODAY, Oct. 13, 2004, at 1A.
166
See Christina DeJong, Survival Analysis and Specific Deterrence: Integrating
Theoretical and Empirical Models of Recidivism, 35 CRIMINOLOGY 561, 574 (1997); Faye S.
Taxman & Alex Piquero, On Preventing Drunk Driving Recidivism: An Examination of
159
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events are less consequential when they occur later in the life course of an
individual.167 An alternate explanation is that those without a prior record
have more to lose from criminal stigma.168
B. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Expungement may be acting in whole or in part as a proxy for other
factors that may reduce the risk of post-exoneration offending. Health and
access to health care are obvious examples. Prisoners’ health problems
have been widely documented. Studies have found that 2% to 3% of
inmates are HIV positive or have AIDS, a rate that is about six times higher
than the rate for the general population.169 Although by law inmates are
entitled to health care in prison, they are often denied access to specialists,
technologically advanced diagnostic techniques, and the latest medications
and procedures.170 These health consequences continue beyond release.
Individuals released from prison have been described as “developmentally
frozen.”171 Formerly incarcerated people may also develop mental
illnesses, including post-traumatic stress disorder, depressive disorders, and
panic disorders.172 The prevalence of certain mental health disorders in
inmate populations is significantly greater than that in the general
population.173 For those who receive it, treatment in prison can begin the
process of recovery and return to wellness; however, continued services in
the community are necessary for sustainability.174 Once released, very few
individuals receive assistance in reinstating their health benefits, and
without coverage, their physical and mental health conditions might persist
and contribute to repeated criminal justice involvement.175
Since
Rehabilitation and Punishment Approaches, 26 J. CRIM. JUST. 129, 140 (1998) (suggesting
that there are stronger labeling effects—increased recidivism—for first-time offenders).
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See Raymond Paternoster & Leeann Iovanni, The Labeling Perspective and
Delinquency: An Elaboration of the Theory and an Assessment of the Evidence, 6 JUST. Q.
359, 385 (1989).
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See Chiricos et al., supra note 143, at 571.
169
See THEODORE M. HAMMETT ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ISSUES AND PRACTICES:
1996–1997 UPDATE: HIV/AIDS, STDS, AND TB IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 5 (1999).
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See PETERSILIA, supra note 145, at 50.
171
See generally EDWARD ZAMBLE & FRANK J. PORPORINO, COPING, BEHAVIOR, AND
ADAPTATION IN PRISON INMATES (1988).
172
Id.
173
See 1 NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTHCARE, THE HEALTH STATUS OF SOON-TO-BE
RELEASED INMATES 24 & tbl.3–3 (2002).
174
See CHRISTY A. VISHER ET AL., URBAN INST., IN NEED OF HELP: EXPERIENCES OF
SERIOUSLY ILL PRISONERS RETURNING TO CINCINNATI 20 (2005).
175
See generally Danielle Wallace & Andrew V. Papachristos, Recidivism and the
Availability of Health Care Organizations, 31 JUST. Q. 588 (2012) . Without continuity of
care and access to services in the community, individuals are likely to return to previous
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employment is a pathway to health care, and expungement is a pathway to
employment, the benefits of expungement may perhaps derive in whole or
in part from giving exonerees access to health care.
Family may be causally knotted in a different way. Family has been
consistently identified as a critical component in helping individuals
transition from prison to society.176
Family support can provide
opportunities for housing, employment, education, and training, which
releasees would not otherwise have. Those without positive and supportive
relationships are more likely to engage in criminal behavior.177 It may be
that people who succeed in having their records expunged
disproportionately have access to resources or support mechanisms that are
more broadly associated with post-release success.
Given the small size of the universe of exonerees and the difficulty in
ascertaining and quantifying a variable such as family connections,
disentangling these causal knots is complicated. But the complications of
identifying first causes should not distract from the importance of
expungement as an ameliorative measure. In A Plague of Prisons, Ernest
Drucker characterizes prisonization as a plague, with many of the facets of
an infectious disease.178 He sees releasees’ inability to get jobs as a central
part of this mechanism,179 and the failure to expunge may be a principal
cause of their inability to get work. As a public policy measure,
expungement is easy and nearly costless to implement. Exonerees may
succeed or fail post-release for many reasons, but expungement can only
help.
In addition to noting concerns about health care and support systems, it
is crucial to acknowledge the relationship between reoffending and both age
and prior criminal activity. Results suggest that the older an individual is at
exoneration, the less likely he is to have a post-exoneration offense. These
findings are consistent with decades of research on the link between age and

behaviors and be reincarcerated. See RE-ENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, COUNCIL OF STATE
GOV’TS, HOW AND WHY MEDICAID MATTERS FOR PEOPLE WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS
RELEASED FROM JAIL: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 1 (2009), available at http://goo.gl/Pl8hHJ.
176
Family members provide both social control and social support, which can inhibit
criminal activity. See ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING:
PATHWAYS AND TURNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE 95–98 (1993); see also Francis T. Cullen et
al., Social Support and Social Reform: A Progressive Crime Control Agenda, 45 CRIME &
DELINQ. 188, 193 (1999). Family members and other supportive individuals “facilitate
informal social controls—those interpersonal bonds that link ex-inmates to churches, lawabiding neighbors, families and communities.” PETERSILIA, supra note 145, at 19.
177
See TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 146, at 20.
178
See generally DRUCKER, supra note 160.
179
Id. at 134–35.
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crime.180 Besides age at release, prior criminal behavior has a strong
positive link to offending after release from prison. Abundant research
supports the idea that prior criminal behavior affects reoffending; if an
individual commits a crime once, then he will probably do it again.181
Some research also suggests that it is the prison environment itself that
contributes to reoffending.182 Although not fully understood, wrongfully
convicted individuals may experience imprisonment in a significantly
different way than other inmates.183 It is well-documented that these
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individuals have difficulty adapting to outside life.184 Our findings suggest
that expungement may help exonerees make a more productive and smooth
transition back to society after incarceration.
CONCLUSION
Basic fairness requires expunging defendants’ records when they are
wrongfully convicted of an offense. Our research suggests that the
evidence-based public policy argument is compelling, as well. For the
roughly one-third of exonerees whose offenses continues to appear on their
criminal records, the wrongful conviction serves as a permanent,
undeserved stigma that impedes their successful reintegration into society.
Even in the best case, it is difficult to move beyond a prison sentence. Our
research suggests that for exonerees whose records have not been
expunged, it is approximately twice as hard. Given the number of cases
examined and other influential factors that may be at issue, these results can
only be deemed to be tentative. It is beyond question, though, that this
issue and the general issue of what facilitates an exoneree’s successful
return to society merit further study.
Going forward, it would be useful to expand this study and its
background checks to other states. Qualitative research can also potentially
help to understand why some exonerees offend following release and some
do not. In this research, it would be useful to explore in interviews the
alternative explanations and mechanisms for post-release success, including
(but not limited to) family and community support, socioeconomic status,
outside agency support, and mental health. For example, is failure to find
employment and, generally speaking, the stigmatizing consequences of the
“ex-convict” label truly the driving force? We acknowledge, too, the
complex relationship between expungement and prior offending and the
possibility that the latter, not the former, is more significantly affecting
post-exoneration offending. Nevertheless, it is almost impossible to
imagine any argument against expungement. At most, it is a nearly costless
way to assist exonerees transitioning back into society. At least, it gives
exonerees something they deserve.
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